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Judicial Interference With Effective 
Advocacy by the Defense 
Bennett L. Gershman* 
A fundamental premise of the American criminal justice system 
is defense counsel's zealous professional advocacy. Representation of a 
criminal defendant to be effective must be vigorous. In administering a 
trial, judges have a duty to ensure a fair and orderly proceeding. On 
occasion, however, judges overstep the line and impede defense counsel's 
advocacy functions unfairly. This article describes some of the ways 
that trial judges may violate legal and ethical standards by improperly 
interfering with defense counsel's courtroomfunctions. 
A cornerstone of the criminal justice system is the ability of de-
fense counsel to advocate his or her case effectively. The Sixth Amend-
ment guarantees a criminal defendant the right to effective assistance 
of counsel. 1 Interference by the trial judge in the advocacy functions of 
defense counsel can undermine this fundamental constitutional right or 
otherwise deprive the defendant of a fair trial. The proper role of a trial 
judge is one of impartiality in demeanor as well as in actions.2 Ajudge's 
mistreatment of defense counsel, or impairment of counsel's ability to 
represent a client effectively, can violate ethical standards,3 as well as 
provide grounds for reversal. 
CritiCism, Abuse, and Threats 
Trial judges must display patience, courtesy, and respect toward 
counsel so as not to prejudice counsel's client or give the jury an im-
pression of partisanship.4 Judges, however, are only human, and the 
* Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law, White Plains, New York. 
Many of the ideas in this article are discussed in my forthcoming book, "Trial Error 
and Misconduct" (The Michie Company, 1997). 
1 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 US 335 (1963). Civil litigants also have a right to be 
represented by retained counsel. See Anderson v. Sheppard, 856 F2d 790, 794 (6th 
Cir. 1988); Potashnick v. Port City Constr. Co., 609 F2d 1101, 1117 (5th Cir. 1980). 
2 United States v. Frazier, 584 F2d 790, 794 (6th Cir. 1978). 
3 See, e.g., ABA Standards for Criminal Justice 6-1.1 (2d ed. 1986) (judge's conduct 
toward counsel should manifest professional respect, courtesy, and fairness); 6-2.4 (judge 
should respect obligation of counsel to present objections, make offers of proof, and to 
make a record); 6-2.5 (judge should respect attorney-client relationship). 
4 United States v. Pisani, 773 F2d 397, 403-404 (2d Cir. 1985); OgJen v. State, 
440 So. 2d 1172, 1174-1175 (Ala. Crim. App. 1983); People v. Dejesus, 369 NE2d 
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pressures of a trial, or the conduct of an attorney, "can on occasion 
cause even the most imperturbable judge to vent irritation or impa-
tience that ideally should be suppressed."5 Nevertheless, depending on 
the nature of the remarks and the circumstances under which they are 
made, a judge's disparagement of counsel may so undermine the 
attorney's effectiveness that it prejudices the jury against the client.6 
Disparaging remarks made in the jury's presence are potentially the 
most damaging. However, even disparaging remarks made outside the 
presence of the jury can be seriously prejudicial to the extent that such 
remarks unnerve and demoralize counsel and impede counsel's effec-
tiveness.7 Moreover, apart from appellate rebuke, abusive and intem-
perate remarks can also result in disciplinary action.8 
Remarks that impugn counsel's integrity are a striking example of 
misconduct.9 A federal conviction was reversed when the judge ad-
monished defense counsel in front of the j ury: "I won't let you tell them 
rotten law." 10 Another federal judge interrupted counsel's closing argu-
ment to advise the jury that counsel's assertion was "absurd and bor-
dering upon a lie," and that "counsel won't get away with it."ll Clearly, 
such reprimands, even if warranted, should be made outside the jury's 
presence. As one court observed, "The judge's castigation of counsel 
752, 755 (NY 1977). See also ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3B(4) 
(1990). 
5 United States v. Nazzaro, 472 F2d 302, 304 (2d Cir. 1973). 
6 U.S. v. Donato, 99 F3d 426, 435 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (trial judge's constant criti-
cism of defense counsel denied defendant a fair trial); United States v. Cassiagnol, 
420 F2d 868, 879 (4th eir. 1970) ("constant or persistent interruption of defense 
counsel may have the effect of contaminating the jury's verdict by indicating the 
judge's evaluation of the weight of the evidence and the merits of the defense"). 
7 United States v. Robinson, 635 F2d 981, 986 (2d Cir. J 9 0) ("a trial judge's 
improper remarks to counsel outside of the jury's presence may unnerve an attorney 
and make il difficult for nim to serve his client to the full extent of his ability"): 
Wruberg v. Israel. 766 F2d 1071 (7th Cir. 1985) (accusing attorney of ingratitude and 
remioding him of his dependence on judge's goodwill may have caused counsel to 
"pull his punches"); Drayton v. Hayes, 589 F2d 117, 122 (2d Cir. 1979) (judge's 
"clumsy effort at comedy" by engaging in hoax with prosecutor and pretending that 
case was going to be reopened was in "poor taste" and reflected "astonishingly bad 
judgment" but did not prejudice defense counsel's ability to function); Oglen, 440 
So. 2d at 1172, 1174 (judge displayed unprofessional conduct during in-chambers 
conference, but jury "shielded" from prejudicial remarks). 
gIn re Waltemede, 409 NYS2d 989 (NY App. Div. 1975) (judge censured, in part, 
for unjustifiable criticism of public defenders). 
9 Derden v. McNeel, 938 F2d 605,611 (5th Cir. 1991). 
10 United States v. Hickman, 592 F2d 931, 936 (6th Cir. 1979). 
11 United States v. Spears, 558 F2d 1296, 1297 (7th Cir. 1977) (trial judge's "dev-
astating" remark was not only improper, it was also erroneous). 
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so discredited him in the eyes of the jury that he could not have re-
mained an effective spokesman for his client."'2 Similarly, after an at-
torney stated to the judge, "I'm sure the court does not mean to criticize my 
trial tactics in front of the jury," the judge responded: "I do. I think you sat 
there and sandbagged us to be frank about it, and I think the jury and I are 
entitled to know why."'3 Equally reprehensible are remarks accusing coun-
sel of "throwing up smoke screens,"14 "pulling a filibuster,"'5 "playing 
games," or "putting words in the witness's mouth."'6 
Ajudge's remarks may also impugn counsel's competence. Ajudge 
occasionally may find it necessary to admonish an attorney to ask proper 
questions, not to be repetitive, and to adhere to proper rules of court-
room decorum. Although such remarks are permissible, stern correc-
tive action ordinarily should be taken outside the presence of the jury. 17 
Gratuitous reproaches about counsel's ineptness in the jury's presence 
can throw counsel off balance and impair counsel's effectiveness. 
For example, in a highly publicized trial, 18 the judge in the jury's 
presence repeatedly criticized defense counsel's competence by remarks 
such as: "I haven't any right in a public trial to give you a course in 
evidence;" "You will have to see a lawyer if you don't understand [my 
ruling];" "I don't know about a defense, but you are doing some con-
ducting." Similarly degrading were another judge's remarks admonish-
ing defense counsel to "sit down and let the other attorney take over if 
you don't know how to cross-examine this man," "Your tactics are not 
correct," and "You are going at it in a very awkward way. Let's do it in 
the right way."19 
12Id. at 1298. See also United States v. Nazzaro, 472 F2d 302, 311 (2d Cir. 1973) 
(prejudice from "numerous acrimonjous exchanges with defense counsel many of 
which occurred in the presence of the jury"). See als Etzel v. Ro enbloom, 189 P2d 
848,850 (Cal. 1948) (judge tells counsel be will sustain objection "if [counsel] does 
not want the jury to know the truth about thal"). 
13 Spencer v. State, 543 A2d 851, 854 (Md. App. 1988) (appellate court noted tbat 
defense counsel did not engage in unethical conduct; had requested to be heard at the 
bench severa) times concerning the subject of the judge's rebuke, but the request was 
denied). 
14 United States v. Williams, 809 F2d 1072, 1089 n.15 (5th Cir. 1987). 
IS State v. Hammier, 312 So. 2d 306, 314 (La. 1975). 
16 People v. Dejesus, 369 NE2d 752, 754 (NY 1977). 
17 Spears, 558 F2d at 1296, 1298; United States v. Gomez, 529 F2d 412, 419 (5th 
Cir. 1976). 
18 United States v. Dellinger, 472 F2d 340, 387-388 ns. 83, 84 (7th Cir. 1972). 
19 Bursten v. United States, 395 F2d 976, 983- 987 (5th Cir. 1968). See also Pau v. 
Yosemite Park & Curry Co., 928 F2d 880, 885 (9th CiL t 991) (judge states: "Coun-
sel, I didn't realize I bad to conduct a law school class. but I guess I do."). 
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Accusing counsel of being asleep, and suggesting sarcastically that 
somebody was using ventriloquism to make counsel's statements for 
him or her;20 rebuking counsel for asking "absurd questions,"2J for "fool-
ishness,"22 or for failing to comply with the court's procedures23, or 
other denigrating comments frequently contributes to appellate rever-
sal,24 Moreover, harsh rebukes even outside the jury's presence, such as 
accu~ing counsel of "disgusting and shysterlike" behavior, can create 
"an embattled and prejudicial atmosphere in the courtroom that makes 
a fair trial impossible."25 
Finally, threatening counsel in the presence of the jury can be seri-
ous misconduct. A federal conviction for attempted extortion was re-
versed when the trial judge threatened to send defense counsel to jail if 
he made any argument relating to the victim's fear.26 Equally improper 
was threatening defense counsel with having to take the stand and re-
spond to questions of the prosecutorY Citing a lawyer for contempt in 
the presence of the jury is improper.28 Factors that are considered in 
determining whether threatening or other heavy-handed remarks by the 
judge require reversal include whether the jury heard the remarks,29 
20 People v. Zammora, 152 P2d 180 (Cal. Ct. App. 1944). 
21 United States v. Williams, 809 F2d 1072, 1088 n.15 (5th Cir. 1987). 
22 McAllister v. State, 178 SW2d 67, 69 (Ark. 1944). 
23 United States v. Diharce-Estrada, 526 F2d 637, 640 (5th Cir. 1976) Gudge ac-
cused counsel of trying to take advantage of the court by requesting a brief continu-
ance to produce an expert witness). 
24 United States v. Pisani, 773 F2d 397, 403-404 (2d Cir. 1985) (criticizing judge's 
"unnecessary barbs" at counsel that were made with "distressing frequency"); People 
v. Pressley, 513 NE2d 921 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987) Gudge raises objection to counsel's 
question on own motion and then grants it); People v. Johns, 415 NYS2d 71 (NY 
App. Div. 1979) (antagonistic and disparaging attitude toward manner in which coun-
sel conducted himself). 
25 United States v. Boatner, 478 F2d 737, 740 (2d Cir. 1973). See also In re Coo-
per, 821 F2d 833, 839 (1st Cir. 1987) ("occasionally exceptional circumstances do 
arise where ajudge's attitude toward a particular attorney is so hostile that the judge's 
impartiality toward the client may reasonably be questioned"). 
26 United States v. Kastenbaum, 613 F2d 86, 88 (5th Cir. 1980). 
27 United States v. Beaty, 722 F2d 1090, 1093 n.3 (3d Cir. 1983). See also United 
States v. DiPaolo, 804 F2d 225,232 (2d Cir. 1986) (threatening defense lawyer with 
jail if he cross-examined government witness about where he was presently living). 
28 United States v. Edwardo-Franco, 885 F2d 1002, 1008 (2d Cir. 1989); United 
States v. Williams, 809 F2d 1072, 1089-1090 (5th Cir. 1987). 
29 United States v. DiPaola, 804 F2d 225, 232 (2d Cir. 1986); United States v. 
Pisani, 773 F2d 397, 404 (2d Cir. 1985); United States v. Block, 755 F2d 770, 776 
(lIth Cir. 1985); United States v. Beaty, 722 F2d 1090, 1093-1094 (3d Cir. 1983); 
United States v. Boatner, 478 F2d 737, 741 (2d Cir. 1973); People v. Harbolt, 253 
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whether the remarks were provoked by counsel, 30 whether the remarks 
were isolated or repeated,3l the length of the trial,32 the evenhandedness 
of the judge's behavior toward the defense and the prosecution,33 the 
presence and effect of curative instructions,34 and the strength of the 
evidence.35 
Threats to counsel made outside the jury's presence also can result 
in a deprivation of the right to the effective assistance of counsel. For 
example, a constitutional violation of the right to counsel was found 
when the judge chastised a court-appointed defense lawyer for ingrati-
tude, and "made a thinly veiled threat not to approve [counsel's] fee 
request at the end of the irial."36 
Interference with Counsel's Representational Functions 
Even absent outright threats, ridicule, or abuse, a court can so inter-
fere with defense counsel's representational functions that it destroys 
the defendant's right to a fair trial and the effective assistance of his or 
her attorney. When the judge's interference is sufficiently pronounced 
that the judge is claimed to have displayed an appearance of bias against 
the defendant, appellate courts review the claim de novo to determine 
whether the conduct communicated to the jury a predisposition against the 
defendant who was thus denied a fair trial.37 When the judge's interference 
is challenged as error and the subject matter of the ruling allows the judge 
room to exercise discretion (as do virtually all rulings on evidence and 
Cal. Rptr. 390,401 (1988); Olgen v. State, 440 So. 2d 1172, 1174 (Ala. Crim. App. 
1983). 
30 Beaty, 722 F2d at 1090, 1094 (3d Cir. 1983); United States v. Pritchett, 699 F2d 
317, 320(6thCir. 1983); United States v. Robinson, 635 F2d 981, 985 (2dCir. 1980). 
31 United States v. Okoronkwo, 46 F3d 426, 436 (5th Cir. 1995); United States v. 
Williams, 809 F2d 1072, 1089 (5th Cir. 1987). 
32 Compare United States v. Hickman, 592 F2d 931 (6lh Cir. 1979) (one-day trial), 
with United States v. Williams, 809 F2d 1072 (5th Cir. 1987) (eight-week trial), and 
United States v. Beaty, 722 F2d 1090 (3d Cir. 1983) (lwo-week trial). 
33 Compare United States v. Tilton, 714 F2d 642, 644 (6th Cir. 1983) (intrusions 
evenly felt by both sides), with Beaty, 722 F2d at 1090, 1095 (disparate treatment), 
and United States v. Boatner, 478 F2d 737, 740 (2d Cir. 1973) (same). 
34 Okoronkwo, 46 F3d at 426, 436; Boatner, 478 F2d at 737,741; People v. Harbolt, 
253 Cal. Rptr. 390,401 (1988). 
35 Beaty, 722 F2d at 1090, 1095; Boatner, 478 F2d at 737, 742. 
36 WaIIberg v. Israel, 766 F2d 1071 (7th Cir. 1985). 
37 United States v. Bermea, 30 F3d 1539, 1569 (5th Cir. 1994). 
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procedure), appellate courts typically accord the trial judge very broad def-
erence and find error only if that discretion is clearly abused. 
Rulings on Objections and Motions 
A judge should allow counsel the opportunity to state objections, 
request rulings, and make a record to describe the judge's conduct that 
counsel considers improper and prejudiciaps A judge's refusal to al-
low counsel to object or make a record may compound the prejudice 
resulting from any impropriety by preventing counsel from attempting 
to limit the impact of the judge's conduct.39 Although a numerical tally 
of the judge's rulings favoring one side or against the other side ordi-
narily is not the test of unfairness,4o such measurement can be an indi-
cation of ajudge's lack of neutrality.41 
For example, in United States v. Dellinger,42 the well-known trial of 
the "Chicago Seven," the judge's rulings were most often adverse to 
the defense, and suggested "hostility" and "contempt" for the defen-
dants. The judge deliberately tried to frustrate the defense's ability to 
present its extensive case by restricting the attorneys' ability to inter-
view witnesses, extending afternoon sessions when the defense case 
began, and then announcing for the first time during a late Friday after-
noon session, after the defense ran out of witnesses, that the trial would 
continue on Saturdays. In another case, partisanship also was demon-
strated when a judge refused to allow defense counsel to reserve mak-
ing an opening statement until after the government had presented its 
case,43 and systematically interrupted defense witnesses or defense coun-
sel sua sponte with the words "objection sustained."44 As one appellate 
panel observed, "It apparently never occurred to the district judge to 
either wait for an objection, or to call counsel up before him out of the 
38 ABA Standards for Criminal Justice 6-2.4 (2d ed. 1986). 
39 United States v. Moorehead, 57 F3d 875 (9th Cir. 1995); People v. Mato, 633 
NE2d 446 (NY 1994). The practice of holding unrecorded bench conferences on 
trial motions is disapproved. See State v. Fletcher. 717 P2d 866, 868 (Ariz. 1986). 
40 United States v. Pisani, 773 F2d 397, 402 (2d Cir. 1985). 
41 United States v. Dellinger, 472 F2d 340, 387 (7th Cir. 1972) Uudge more likely 
to rule against defense than against government). 
42 Dellinger, 472 F2d at 340. 
43 United States v. Hickman, 592 F2d 931,934 (6th Cir. 1979). 
44 Crandell v. United States. 703 F2d 74, 76-77 (4th Cir. 1983); Hickman, 592 
F2d at 934; People v. Pressley, 513 NE2d 921, 925 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987). 
429 
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hearing of the jury and admonish them if they were misbehaving or 
bungling an examination of a witness."45 
Determining whether such interference displays an appearance of 
partiality or is appropriately related to efficient trial management de-
pends on a careful review of the facts. For example, a trial of multiple 
defendants, or a lengthy or complex trial, may allow more room for 
judicial involvement to prevent repetition and confusion.46 Refusing to 
allow counsel to make an offer of proof as to the correctness of his or 
her position ordinarily is improperY Ruling on a motion for acquittal 
in the jury's presence is also improper.48 Counsel's objections on mat-
ters of law typically should be made outside the jury's presence to pre-
vent any suggestion of antagonism between counsel and the judge. 
Therefore, denying counsel the opportunity to make objections to jury 
instructions outside the jury's presence is error,49 and may even consti~ 
tute reversible error. 50 
Some rulings that hamper counsel's ability to make objections, such 
as requiring counsel to write out objections, or denying sidebar confer-
ences, are problematic, but may be allowed when the ruling appears to 
be a reasonable measure to expedite the examination of witnesses, and 
no prejudice is shown.51 A court has considerable latitude in deciding 
whether an evidentiary hearing should be granted. Denying an 
evidentiary hearing on a motion is error only if there are factual dis-
putes that, ifresolved in the defendant's favor, would entitle him or her 
to the requested relief. 52 
4' Hickman, 592 F2d at 934. See also People v. Ashwal, 347 NE2d 564 (NY 1975) 
(judge's repeated overruling of proper defense objections during prosecutor's sum-
mation enhances the possibility of prejudice by "giving standing to the statement of 
the District Attorney as legitimate argument"). 
46 United States v. Bermea, 30 F3d 1539, 1570-1571 (5th Cir. 1994); United States 
v. Manko, 979 F2d 900 (2d Cir. 1992). 
47 People v. Eckert, 551 NE2d 820, 822-824 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990); Pressley, 513 
NE2d at 921,926. 
48 United States v. Diharce-Estrada, 526 F2d 637,641 (5th Cir. 1976). 
49 Hamling v. United States, 418 US 87 (1974) (con truing Fed. R. Crim. P. 30). 
See also Fed. R. Civ. P. 51. The rule is "designed t avoid the subtle psychological 
pressures upon the jurors which would arise.if they were to view and hear defense 
counsel in a posture of antagonism toward the judge." Hamling, upra at 134. 
50 United States v. Sloan, 811 F2d 1359 (10th Cir. 1987); United States v. Salinas, 
601 F2d 1279 (5th Cir. 1979). 
51 United States v. Pisani, 773 F2d 397, 402--403 (2d Cir. 1985) (requiring written 
objections); United States v. Van Dyke, 14 F3d 415 (8th Cir. 1993) (disallowing 
sidebar conferences). 
52 United States v. Staula, 80 F3d 596, 603 (1st Cir. 1996). 
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Limiting Argument of Counsel 
A trial judge has broad discretion over the subject matter of closing 
argument, and the amount of time allotted to counsel for making clos-
ing argument, and error will be found only ifthat discretion is abused.53 
Although ajudge has an obligation to use judicial time efficiently,54 an 
undue emphasis on speed can deprive a defendant of a fair trial and the 
effective assistance of counsel. 55 Although counsel is not allowed to 
filibuster, he or she must be given sufficient time to fully and com-
pletely present argument to the jury. 56 Imposing unreasonable time lim-
its on counsel's closing argument may be an abuse of discretion,57 as 
well as an interference with counsel's ability to develop plausible legal 
arguments supported by the facts. 58 
Important factors bearing on the appropriateness of the judge's time 
limitations are length and complexity of the trial, severity of the charges, 
number of defendants, number of witnesses, and possible punishment. 
Thus, a 30-minute limitation on counsel's closing argument in a mur-
der case was found to have unreasonably deprived the defendant of a 
fair triaP9 The trial was complex, and the restriction severely impeded 
53 United States v. Moye, 951 F2d 59 (5th Cir. 1992) (time limits); United States 
v. Gaines, 690 F2d 849 (11 th Cir. 1982) (counsel may not be prevented from making 
all legal arguments supported by the facts). 
54 ABA Standards for Criminal Justice 6-1.4 (2d ed. 1986). 
55 United States v. Diharce-Estrada, 526 F2d 637 (5th Cir. 1976) ("The court's 
opening remarks to the jurors emphasizing the dispatch he expected, coupled with 
the immoderate treatment accorded defense counsel for his allegedly unjustified at-
tempts to delay the trial, can only be judged by us to have put undue pressure on the 
jury to reach a verdict more swiftly than the ends of justice will allow."). 
56 United States v. Okoronkwo, 46 F3d 426, 437 (5th Cir. 1995) ("in multiple-
count, multiple-defendant criminal cases tried en masse, especially those involving 
complex factual scenarios, trial courts should be mindful that each defendant should 
be given adequate time in closing argument to mete out the evidence and issues 
particular to that defendant and individualize his/her defense to the jury"). 
57 Compare State v. Mitchell, 365 SE2d 554 (NC 1988) (refusing to allow both 
defense attorneys to address jury during closing argument in murder case prejudicial 
error), and Stanley v. State, 453 So. 2d 530 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (arbitrarily 
limiting closing argument in grand larceny prosecution to 10 minutes reversible er-
ror), with United States v. Bednar, 728 F2d 1043 (8th Cir. 1984) (limit of20 minutes 
upheld), and United States v. Fesler, 781 F2d 384 (5th Cir. 1986) (limit of 22.5 
minutes upheld). 
58 United States v. Hall, 77 F3d 398, 400 (11th Cir. 1996) (preventing counsel 
from arguing legal concepts that would be included in judge's jury instructions was 
abuse of discretion); United States v. Tory, 52 F3d 207, 210 (9th Cir. 1995) (exclud-
ing legal argument plausibly based on the evidence was abuse of discretion). 
59 Stockton v. State, 544 So. 2d 1006 (Fla. 1989). 
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counsel's ability to develop his argument. Moreover, the time limit was 
set mainly for the convenience of the jurors to enable them to finish the 
case before the weekend. Similarly, restricting counsel's argument to 
one hour in a capital murder case was held to be an abuse of discre-
tion.60 As the court noted, "[T]he unreasonableness of this restriction is 
accentuated when it is realized that the outcome was to cast the die of 
fate for the whole of eternity for the defendant."61 
However, when potentially complex issues are not seriously dis-
puted,62 or do not require elaborate presentation,63 no abuse of discre-
tion will be found. Moreover, the failure of defense counsel to request 
additional time at the termination of closing argument may bear on the 
soundness of the judge's limitation.64 Other substantive restrictions also 
can be error.65 Examples include forbidding counsel to argue proper 
inferences from the evidence,66 refusing to allow arguments on points 
of law that are included in the judge's charge,67 refusing to allow more 
than one of defendant's counsel to address the jury in a capital murder 
case,68 refusing to allow defense counsel to reserve opening argument 
until the government completed its case,69 or forcing defense counsel to 
complete closing argument before a recess as a sanction for purport-
edly delaying the tria1.70 
60 Collier v. State, 705 P2d 1126 (Nev. 1985). 
61 Id. at 1131-1132. Compare Stanley v. State, 453 So. 2d 530 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1984) (limiting time for closing argument in grand larceny case to 10 minutes re-
versible conduct), with Williams v. State, 453 So. 2d 516 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) 
(limiting time for closing argument in burglary prosecution to 45 minutes permis-
sible). 
62 United States v. Okoronkwo, 46 F3d 426 (5th Cir. 1995) (existence of con-
spiracy not challenged). 
63 United States v. Leal, 30 F3d 577, 586 (5th Cir. 1994) (defense of lack of intent 
did not require extended discussion). 
64 Leal, 30 F3d at 577, 586. 
65 Preventing defense counsel from arguing possible punishment is generally dis-
allowed. See United States v. McDonald, 933 F2d 1519,1526 (10th Cir. 1991). But 
see United States v. Datcher, 830 F. Supp. 411 (MD Tenn. 1993) (permitting argu-
ment on possible punishment under federal sentencing guidelines). 
66 Tory, 52 F3d at 207,210. 
67 United States v. Hall, 77 F3d 398, 400-401 (11th Cir. 1996) (error to prevent 
counsel from speaking about concept of reasonable dOUbt). But see United States v. 
Lerch, 996 F2d 158, 162 (7th Cir. 1993) (circuit rule barring attorneys from attempt-
ing to define reasonable doubt to ajury). 
68 State v. Mitchell, 365 SE2d 554 (NC 1988). 
69 United States v. Hickman, 592 F2d 931, 934 (6th Cir. 1979). 
70 United States v. Diharce-Estrada, 526 F2d 637 (5th Cir. 1976). 
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Ajudge has the discretion to allow additional argument following a 
supplemental instruction, particularly when a new legal theory is pre-
sented to the jury.71 Refusing to allow additional argument in such cir-
cumstances may constitute an abuse of discretion when it prevents 
counsel from making a point essential to the defense. 72 Appellate courts 
will examine the contested limitation in light of the issues and counsel's 
main argument to determine whether the defense was prejudiced by the 
limitation.73 
Restricting Cross-Examination 
The Sixth Amendment's confrontation clause guarantees a defen-
dant the right to cross-examine adverse witnesses.74 However, the right 
of cross-examination, whether analyzed as a constitutional or an 
evidentiary matter, is not absolute. As a constitutional issue, a judge 
must afford the defense a reasonable opportunity to develop the whole 
picture, and an appellate court reviews any limitation de novo.75 As-
suming that core constitutional concerns have been satisfied, judges 
are afforded broad discretion to impose reasonable limitations on cross-
examination. Legitimate concerns include harassment of witnesses, 
confusion of issues, witness safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or 
only marginally relevant, and such restrictions will be reversible error 
only when discretion has been manifestly abused.76 As the United States 
Supreme Court has observed, counsel must be allowed "an opportunity 
for effective cross-examination, not cross-examination that is effective 
in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish."77 
However, ajudge's wide latitude to regulate cross-examination does 
not justify a "curtailment which keeps from the jury relevant and im-
71 United States v. Civelli, 883 F2d 191,196 (2d Cir. 1989); Loveless v. United 
States, 260 F2d 487 (DC Cir. 1958). 
72 United States v. Sawyer, 443 F2d 712, 713 (DC Cir. 1971). 
73 United States v. Horton, 921 F2d 540 (4th Cir. 1990) (no prejudice by judge 
permitting only three minutes of argument after supplementary instruction). 
74 Davis v. Alaska, 415 US 308,315-316 (1974). 
75 United States v. Laboy-Delgado, 84 F3d 22, 28 (lst Cir. 1996). 
76 Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 US 673, 679 (1986); Alford v. United States, 282 
US 687, 694 (1931); Laboy-Delgado, 84 F3d at 22,28; United States v. Maldonado-
Rivera. 922 F2d 934.955 (2d Cir. 1990). See, e.g., Fed. R. Evid. 611(a) ("court shall 
exercise reasonable control over mode and interrogation of witnesses"); Fed. R. Evid. 
611(b) (judge controls scope of cross-examination). 
77 Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 US 15,20 (1985). See also Davis, 415 US at 308, 
316. 
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portant facts bearing on the trustwOlthiness of crucial testimony."78 Prob-
ing a witness's motivation in testifying, including possible self-interest 
and any bias or prejudice against the defendant, is one of the principal 
objects of cross-examination, whose limitation by the judge produces 
frequent appellate challenges. A judge's prohibition or substantial curtail-
ment of cross-examination into a witness's bias is likely to be error.79 
Thus, in Delaware v. Van Arsdall,80 it was constitutionally imper-
missible for the trial judge to bar all cross-examination of a govern-
ment witness concerning a prior criminal charge that had been dismissed 
in an effort to secure the witness's testimony. Similarly, in Davis v. 
Alaska,8] counsel was not allowed to cross-examine the government's 
principal witness as to the reason for his cooperation. Convictions ordi-
narily are reversed when the judge completely bars cross-examination 
as to the witness's motivation for testifying,82 or with respect to other 
relevant areas of testimony.83 A judge acts within permissible discre-
tion when he or she limits cross-examination that is cumulative,84 re-
petitive,85 of marginal relevance,86 harassing,87 or otherwise improper. 88 
n United States v. Pedroza, 750 F2d 187, 195-196 (2d Cir. 1990) (quoting Gor-
don v. United States, 344 US 414, 423 (1953». 
7~ Olden v. Kentucky, 488 US 227 (1988); Van Arsdall, 475 US 31678-679; Davis 
v. Alaska, 415 US 308, 318 (1974); Henry v. Speckard, 22 F3d 1209 (2d Cir. 1994). 
But see United States v. Salerno, 937 F2d 797, 810 (2d Cir. 1991) ("a defendant does 
not have an absolute right to ex.amine a government witness to elicit evidence of 
bias"); Ebb v. Stale, 671 A2d 974 (Md. 1996) (barring cross-examination of govern-
ment witness about pending criminal charges not abuse of discretion). 
80 VanArsdall, 475 US at 673. 
81 Davis, 415 US at 308. 
82 United States v. Alexius, 76 F3d 642 (5th Cir. 1996); United States v. Pritchett, 
699 F2d 317 (6th Cir. 1983); People v. Eckert, 551 NE2d 820 (III. App. Ct. 1990); 
Ford v. United States, 549 A2d 1124 (DC App. 1988); People v. Pressley, 513 NE2d 
921 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987). 
83 United States v. Reindeau, 947 F2d 32 (2d Cir. 1991) (improper restriction of 
cross-examination of expert); Crandel l v. United States, 703 F2d 74, 76 (4th Cir. 
1983) (restricting cross-examination of ex pert wi tness); People v. Carter, 450 NYS2d 
203 (NY App. Div. 1982) (restricting cross-examination of complainant). See also 
Pollard v. Fennell, 400 F2d 421 (4th Cir . .1968). 
84 United States v. Mitchell, 49 F3d 769, 780 (DC Cir. 1995) (defense counsel 
cross-examined another government witness concerning same matter). 
85 Laboy-Delgado, 84 F3d at 22, 28. 
86 United States v. Corgain, 5 F3d 5 (1st Cir. 1993) (fact that bank teller had not 
identified other participants in robbery marginally relevant). 
87 United States v. McCarty, 82 F3d 943 (10th Cir. 1996) (questions concerning 
unsupported allegations of sexual impropriety of government witness disallowed). 
88 United States v. Rainone, 32 F3d 1203 (7th Cir. 1994) (questions about notes 
witness wrote to his attorney invade attorney-client privilege). 
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Even if the judge's restriction on cross-examination is unreason-
able and arguably a violation of the right of confrontation, harmless 
error analysis must still be performed. ~l) Among the factors considered 
in assessing the effect of the error are the importance of the witness's 
testimony, whether the testimony was cumulative, the presence of con-
tradictory evidence on material points, the extent of cross-examination 
otherwise permitted, and the strength of the evidence against the defen-
dantYo When a judge does not bar cross-examination completely, but 
allows counsel some latitude to explore the issue, the restriction ordi-
narily will be upheld. 91 Counsel whose cross-examination has been re-
stricted should make reasonable efforts to alert the judge to the relevance 
of the proposed interrogation .92 
Interference With Attorney-Client Consultation 
A judge has a duty to respect the attorney-client relationship.93 Ju-
dicial interference with counsel's ability to consult with a client may 
run afoul of this precept and violate the Sixth Amendment right to as-
sistance of counsel. Such nonconsultation directives typically occur 
during recesses in a trial when the defendant is on the witness stand. 
The rationale behind such nondiscussion orders rests not on the as-
sumption that defense counsel will engage in unethical coaching, but 
rather, that when a defendant becomes a witness he or she has no con-
stitutional right to consult with his or her lawyer while testifying.94 
For example, in Geders v. United States,95 the Supreme Court held 
that a trial judge's order directing the defendant not to consult with his 
X9 Henry v. Speckard, 22 F3d 1209, 1215-1216 (2d Cir. 1994 ) (constitutional 
error in restricting cross-examination into possible bias but error harmless) . 
9() Id. at 1215-1216. 
91 Laboy-Delgado, 84 F3d at 22, 28; United States v. Cruz, 894 F2d 41 (2d Cir. 
1990); United States v. Slone, 833 F2d 595 (6th Cir. 1987); Van Ness v. United 
States, 568 A2d 1079 (DC App. 1990). 
92 Jones v. Berry, 880 F2d 670, 673 (2d Cir. 1989). See also United States v. 
Blackwood, 456 F2d 526 (2d Cir. 1972) (judge's refusal to recall government wit-
ness during defendant's case not abuse of discretion when defense counsel failed to 
explain why he did not cross-examine witness on subject during his earlier cross-
examination). 
93 ABA Standards for Criminal Justice 6-2.5 (2d ed. 1986). 
94 Perry v. Leeke, 488 US 272 (1989). Such nondiscussion orders are a corollary 
to the broader rule authorizing judges to sequester witnesses to lessen danger that 
their testimony will be influenced by hearing what other witnesses say and to in-
crease likelihood that they will give truthful testimony. 
95 Geders v. United States, 425 US 80 (1976) . 
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attorney during an overnight recess, called while the defendant was on 
the witness stand, violated the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to 
the assistance of counsel. Because normal consultation between coun-
sel and client during an overnight recess would embrace matters that go 
well beyond the defendant's own testimony, such as the availability of 
other witnesses, trial tactics, and the possibility of a plea bargain, the 
judge's order effectively barred discussion of these matters and thereby 
violated the defendant's constitutional right to consult with (;Ounse!. 
Since Geders, federal and state courts have addressed the permissi-
bility of orders barring access by a criminal defendant to his or her 
attorney during other trial recesses. 96 In reviewing the permissibility of 
such nonconsultation orders, a distinction is usually drawn between 
lengthy and brief recesses. For example, in Perry v. Leeke,97 the Su-
preme Cou111imited Geders, holding that an order directing the defen-
dant not to can ult with his attorney during a I5-minute recess declared 
after the defendant completed his direct examination did not violate the 
defendant's right to counsel: "[W]hen a defendant becomes a witness, 
he has no constitutional right to consult with his lawyer while he is 
testifying."98 In distinguishing between long and short recesses, the Su-
preme Court explained that a defendant should not be prevented from 
consulting with counsel on trial-related matters during a lengthy re-
96 United S tates v. Cobb, 905 F2d 784 (41h Cir. 1990) (order prohibiting defen-
dant from discussing cross-examination during weekend recess violated Sixth Amend-
ment); Sanders v. Lane, 861 F2d 1033 (7lh Cir. 198H) (error to deny access during 
lunchtime recess)' Bova v. Dugger, 858 F2d 1539 ( 11th Cir. 1988) (error to deny 
access during IS-minute recess); People v. Joseph, 646 NE2d 807 (NY L994) (error 
to bar communication during weekend recess); People v. Enrique, 600 NE2d 229 
(NY 1992) (not improper to ban consultation during luncheon recess called during 
cross-examination of defendant); Moore v. Commonwealth , 771 SW2d 34 (Ky. 1989) 
(not improper to bar consultation during luncheon recess called during direct exami-
nation of defendant); Wooten-Bey v. Slate 547 A2d J 086 (Md. App. 1988) (error to 
deny acces " during lengU1Y lu nche 11 recess. but error cured by permitt.ing 
postiuncheon discussion with counse l and opportunity for further redirect). 
V7 Perry v. Leeke, 488 US 272 ([ 989). 
~8 rd. at 281. The Court analogized the situation to the familiar rule allowing a 
judge to sequester witnesses to maintain the integrity of te timony. See Fed. R. Evid. 
615; United Slates v. Hargrove, 929 F2d 3J6, 320- 32 1 (7th Cir. 1991) (no violation 
of sequestration order when government's witnes ' was not intended (0 be called and 
was called only after testimony of surprise witnes for the defense); United States v. 
Lus~ier, 929 F2d 25, 30 (lsI Cir. 1991) (defendant nol prejudiced by judge s order 
allowing government's case agent to remain in court); United States v. Nazzaro, 472 
F2d 303 (2d Cil'. 1973) (judge acted improperly in exempting government agent 
from sequestration order); State v. Kennedy, 250 SE2d 338 (SC 1978) (judge refuses 
to sequester witnesses during defendant's testimony, telling defense counsel in pres-
ence of jury: "I want them to hear this fellow's lies.' ). 
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cess.99 Moreover, even during a short recess, ajudge may permit con-
sultation with counsel regarding trial issues generally, but bar discus-
sion concerning ongoing testimony. 100 
Undermining Counsel's Ability to Defend Effectively 
Judges in various ways can hamper defense counsel's ability to 
challenge the prosecution's case effectively. Some of these actions defy 
any unifying principle; they often appear to be idiosyncratic. Judges 
have interfered with counsel's ability to make independent decisions 
concerning how to present the defense by barring defense summation 
at a bench trial,101 barring the defendant from giving testimony in his or 
her own defense,102 requiring that the defendant be the first defense 
witness,103 barring direct examination of the defendant,104 limiting the 
number of witnesses that the defense may call,105 restricting defense 
counsel's right to consult with his or her own expert,106 and limiting 
defense access to prospective witnesses. 107 
Judicial actions that deny the defendant the resources to mount an 
effective defense must be carefully scrutinized under equal protection 
and due process principles. An indigent defendant may not be deprived 
of the basic tools necessary to conduct an adequate defense. Transcripts 
of prior proceedings, such as prior trials, suppression hearings, prelimi-
nary hearings, and previous testimony in the same trial, are vital tools 
needed to conduct an effective defense. Indigents have a constitutional 
right to be afforded free transcripts when reasonably necessary to present 
99 Cobb, 905 F2d at 784 (order prohibiting defendant from discussing cross-ex-
amination during weekend recess violated Sixth Amendment). 
100 People v. Stoner, 432 NE2d 348 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982). 
101 Herring v. New York, 422 US 853 (1975). 
102 Rock v. Arkansas, 483 US 44 (1987). But see United States v. Stewart, 20 F3d 
911 (8th Cir. 1994) (refusal to allow defendant to testify after both sides rested and 
closing arguments about to begin not error). 
103 Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 US 605 (1972). 
104 Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 US 570 (1961). 
105 United States v. Holmes, 44 F3d 1150 (2d Cir. 1995). 
106 People v. Santana, 600 NE2d 201 (NY 1992) (court bars consultation until 
after prosecution expert completed his testimony). 
107 United States v. Medina, 992 F2d 573 (6th Cir. 1993) (denial of defense re-
quest to interview government witness until after his direct testimony did not de-
prive defendants of right to fair trial). 
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an effective defense. 108 The mere request for a transcript, however, does 
not automatically require the court to order its preparation at state ex-
pense. The denial of a transcript, which is reviewed d novo, is a con-
stitutional error only when the transcript is of value t the trial for which 
it is sought, and there are no adequate alternatives that would fulfill the 
same functions as a transcript. 109 
It can ordinarily be assumed that a transcript is valuable in provid-
ing the defense with pretrial discovery as welJ as a lool for impeach-
ment of prosecution witnesses. It is infrequent that a transcript will be 
found to be of little value in challenging the prosecution's case. 110 More 
likely will be the claim that adequate alternatives exist, such as the 
ability of counsel to reconstruct the prior proceedings, or to call the 
court reporter as a witness. I I ) Relevant factors are the nature of the pro-
ceeding, length of the proceeding, length of the interval, and familiar-
ity of present counsel with the previous proceeding.) 1'2. The defen e does 
not have any burden of establishing a particularized need for the transcript, 
or to refute a claim that adequate alternatives exist 113 Whether prejudice 
needs to be shown following the denial of a transcript is unclear.))4 
In addition to denying free transcripts courts can also impede an 
effective defense by denying an indigent free expert r investigative 
assistance. A defendant is constitutionally entitled to such assistance. 115 
In contrast to the furnishing of transcripts, the defendant bears the bur-
den of establishing with reasonable particularity the necessity for such 
assistance. 116 The court's determination is reviewed for abuse of discre-
108 Britt v. North Carolina, 404 US 226 (1971); Roberts v. LaVallee, 389 US 40 
(1967); United States v. Pul ido, 879 F2d 1255 (5th Cir. 1989); People v. Coleman, 
61 L N1!2d 285 (NY 1993). See also 18 USC § 3006A( e)( I). 
109 Britt, 404 US at 227. 
110 Matthews v. Price, 83 F3d 328 (10th Cir. 1996) (transcript would have offered 
relatively little value in cross-examining police officer about lack of penetration 
during sexual assault because penetration is not element of crime). 
III Britt, 404 US at 228. 
112 Pulido, 879 F2d at 1255. 
113 Britt, 404 US at 228. Britt was a unique case, resting on highly specialized 
circumstances, including defense counsel's virtual concession of the existence of 
adequate alternatives to a transcript. 
114 Compare United States v. Kirk, 844 F2d 660 (9lh Ck \988) (prejudice re-
quired), and United States v. Bari, 750 F2d 1169 (2d Cir. 1984) (prejudice required), 
with United States v. Pulido, 879 F2d 1255 (5th Cir. 1989) (no prejudice need be 
shown). 
115 Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 US 68 (\985). 
116 Caldwell v. Mississippi , 472 US 320, 323 n.l (1985) (ballistics and fingerprint 
expert); Ake, 470 US al68 (psychjatric expert); United States v. Greschner, 802 F2d 
373 (10th Cir. 1986) (investigative assistance). 
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tion,1I7 and any error in denying the request must be shown to have 
prejudiced the defense. 118 
Finally, courts can undermine effective representation in other ways, 
such as ordering the defense to proceed under conflicted representa-
tion, 119 removing the defense attorney from the case, I 20 or denying a pro 
se defendant the right to participate in sidebar conferences with the 
court. 121 Ajudge's failure to adequately explain the basis for a ruling or 
order not only hampers defense counsel's ability to make subsequent 
decisions but also interferes with an appellate court's ability to review 
the record properly. 122 
117 United States v. Nichols, 21 F3d 1016 (lOth Cir. 1994). 
118Id . 
119 Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 US 475 (1978); Selsor v. Kaiser, 81 F3d 1492 (10th 
Cir. 1996). 
120 People v. Johnson. 547 NW2d 65 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996); Harling v. United 
States, 387 A2d 1101 (DC App. 1978); Smith v. Superior Ct. ofLo Angeles County. 
440 P2d 65 (Cal. 1968). A court may remove a lawyer 011 the basis of gr ss incom-
petence, physical incapacity. or contumacious conduct. Johllson, 547 NW2d at 68. 
Prejudice need not be shown when defendant is arbitrarily denied his Sixth Amend-
ment right to counsel of hi s choice. Bland v. California Dep't of Corrections, 20 F3d 
1469. 1478 (9th Cir. 1994). 
121 United States v. McDermott, 64 F3d 1448 (10th Cir. 1995); People v. Rosen, 
613 NE2d 946 (NY 1993). See Faretta v. California, 422 US 806 (1975). But see 
United States v. Mills, 895 F2d 897 (2d Cir. 1990) (no "substantial violation" of 
sixth amendment Faretta right wbere standby counsel participated and defendant 
excluded in only a few instances). If a Sixth Amendment violation relating to the 
Faretta right to conduct one's own defense is found, hannless error analysis does 
not apply. McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 US 168. 177 n.8 (1984). 
122 A judge should adequately explain the basis for ruling lO enable an appellate 
court to review the matter. Failure to make a proper record may require remand for 
factual findings. See Guzman v. Scully, 80 F3d 772. 776 (2d Cir. L996) (remand for 
failure to make specitic findings demonstrating that closing the courtroom during 
testimony of prosecution witness essential and narrowly tailored); Duckett v. Godinez, 
67 F3d 734. 749 (9th Cir. 1995) (remlU1d for failure 10 make sufficient and specific 
fmdings as to necessity of physical restraints on defendant); U oited States v. Nagib, 
56 F3d 798, 807 (7th Cir. 1995) (remanded for failure to make specific findings to 
support admission of evidence of prior bad acts as probative of defendant's knowl-
edge and motive). See also United States v. Jackson, 60F3d 128, L35 (2d Cir. 1995) 
("It would have been helpful to our review of the [sequestration] issue jf the trial 
judge had articulated the basis for the exerci e of her discretion' ); Helium v. War-
den, 28 F3d 903, 907 (8th Cir. 1994) ("It would have been helpful to us" if trial court 
articulated its reasons for imposing securilY measure ); United State v. Perez, 35 
F3d 632 (1 st Cir. 1994) ("as a general matter district courts should articulate the bases of 
their factual findings related to Batson challenges more clearly"). But see United States 
v. Gonzales, 12 F3d 298, 300 (1st Cir. 1993) ("We do not demand that judges, when 
explaining the bases for their rulings, be precise to the point of pedantry."). 
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Refusal to Grant Recess or Continuance 
The decision to grant or deny a recess or continuance ordinarily lies 
within a judge' broad discretion to administer the trial. l23 Such deter-
minations are error only for a clear abuse of discretion 124 "Only unrea-
sonable and arbitrary insi tence upon expeditiousness in the face of 
justifiable request for delay constitutes an abuse of discretion."'25 The 
burden is on the defense to demonstrate cJeady that it has been preju-
diced by the judge' refusal to grant a delay. 126 A reviewing c urt will 
examine several factors, including the inconvemence on the COUlt, wit-
nesses, counsel, or the parties; whether other continuances have been 
granted; whether legitimate reasons exist for the delay; whether the 
delay is the defendant's faLllt; and whether a denial would prejudice the 
defendant. 127 The last factQr is the most critical. An appellate court will 
not reverse unless the defendant suffered prejudice. 128 
To be sure, judges "cannot permit tbemseJve to become sanctuar-
ies for chrome procrastination and irrespon ibility on the part of either 
litigants or attorneys."129 Nevertheless, requests for continuances are 
often made in good faith, and nOl for lack of due diligence, and under 
circum tances in which the denial may serioLlsly impair a defendant's 
right to a fair trial. The denjal of a reque ,t for a delay based on illness of 
a patty witness, or counsel may be an abuse of discretion when there 
has been a suffi.cient showing thal the request was made in good faith, 
and that prejudice would result from the denial. '30 Similarly, when a 
123 Morris v. Slappy, 461 US 1,11 (1983); United States v. Tran, 16 F3d 897. 905 
(8th Cir. 1994); United States v. Lussier. 929 F2d 25, 28 (lst Cir. 1991); United 
States v. Wynne. 993 F2d 760,767 (lOlh Cit. 1993); United States v. Cordell. 924 
F2d 614 (6th Cir. ] 991); People v. Singleton, 361 NE2d 1003 (NY 1977). See Anno-
tation, Propriety and Prejudicial Effect of Federal District Judge's Granting or De-
nying Brief Recess During Trial. 2 1 ALR Fed. 948 (1974). 
)24 United States v. Studley, 783 F2d 934 (9th Cir. 1986); United States v. Martin, 
740 F2d 1352 (6th Cir. 1984). 
125 United States v. Rodriguez Cortes, 949 F2d 532, 545 (1st Cif. 1991). 
)26 United States v. Wirsing, 719 F2d 859, 866 (6th Cir. 1983). 
127 Unjted State v. Fowlie, 24 F3d 1059. 1069 (9th Cir. J994). For a similar 
formulation, see United States v. Soldevila-Lopez. 17 F3d 480. 488 (1stOr. 1994) 
(citing as factors the defendant's diligence in being ready for the proceeding; the 
Ilkelihood that a continuance would serve a useful purpose; inconvenience to the 
parties. courl. or witnesses; and prejudice to the defendant); United States v. Wynne. 
993 F2d 760, 767 (10th Clr. 1993) (same). 
128 United States v. Maybusher, 735 F2d 366, 369 (9th Cir. 1984). 
129 County of San Bernardino v. Dorio Mining & Eng'g Corp., 72 Cal. App. 3d 
776, 780, 140 Cal. Rptr. 383 (1977). 
130 Moll v. Moll, 231 NW2d 769 (Mo. 1975); Kalmus v. Kalmus, 230 P2d 57,63 
(Cal. 1951). 
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fundamental right is involved, such as securing the attendance of a 
material witness, a judge's refusal to grant a delay may be an abuse of 
discretion and a violation of the Sixth Amendment. 131 When delays are 
requested to secure the attendance of witnesses, counsel must show 
that he or she made a good faith effort to secure the witness's atten-
dance prior to requesting the adjournment, 132 and that the witness would 
provide favorable evidence. 133 
By contrast, denying a brief recess during the trial to permit coun-
sel to confer with a client concerning crucial trial matters, such as 
whether the defendant should take the stand, does not obstruct orderly 
procedure. 134 However, some showing should be made as to the neces-
sity for the delay, and the prejudice that would result from its denial. 135 
Moreover, when the defense has been given ample opportunity to pro-
tect its interests, such as having already been granted several adjourn-
ments, the refusal of a judge to further accommodate counsel will 
ordinarily be upheld. 136 
Denial of a request to give counsel more time to prepare will be 
evaluated in light of the reasons for the request, the good faith and 
diligence of counsel, and the resulting prejudice from the refusal of the 
judge to honor the request. 137 A request for a continuance based on preju-
131 Bland v. California Dep't of Corrections, 20 F3d 1469 (9th Cir. 1994) (denial 
of continuance to obtain new counsel violated Sixth Amendment); Wirsing, 719 F2d 
at 859; Singleton v. Lefkowitz, 583 F2d 6 I 8 (2d Cir. 1978); Johnson v. Johnson, 375 
F. Supp. 872 (WD Mich. 1974) (defendant's motion for a day's continuance to se-
cure presence of crucial witnesse violated right to compulsory process); People v. 
Foy, 299 NE2d 664 (NY 1973); Peopl v. O burn, 547 NYS2d 749 (NY App. Div. 
1989). But see Unjted States v. Tran, 16 P3d 897,906 (8th Cir. 1994); United States 
v. Beverly, 5 F3d 633, 641 (2d Cir. 1,993); People v. Belotti, 563 NYS2d 510 (NY 
App. Div. 1990); State v. Monahan, 480 A2d 863 (NH 1984). 
132 Belotti, 563 NYS2d at 510. 
133 Lefkowitz, 583 F2d at 623 ("in the absence of some showing of what favorable 
evidence the witness would provide if compelled to testify, it is not improper to deny 
a continuance"). When government conduct has contributed to the unavailability of 
the witness, Ule requisite showing is relaxed. rd. 
134 People v. Spears, 474 NE2d 1189 (NY 1984). 
135 United States v. Darby, 744 F2d 1508 (11th Cir. 1984). 
136 United States v. Brand, 80 F3d 560 (1st Cir. 1996); People v. Singleton, 361 
NE2d 1003 (NY 1977). 
137 Bland v. California Dep't of Corrections, 20 F3d 1469 (9th Cir. 1994) (denial 
of continuance to substitute new counsel abuse of discretion and violation of Sixth 
Amendment); Darby, 744 F2d at 1508 (denial of continuance neither an abuse of 
discretion nor a violation of due process); Kelly v. Wingo, 472 F2d 717 (6th Cir. 
1973); Commonwealth v. Fleming, 480 A2d 1214 (Pa. Super, Ct. 1984); Nave v, 
State, 318 SE2d 753 (Ga. Ct. App. 1984), Moreover, counsel's failure to file a mo-
Lion for a continuance is an important factor in evaluating the claim. See Birt v. 
Montgomery, 725 F2d 587, 595 ( 11th Cir. 1984 ) (en banc). 
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dicial media publicity must be carefully examined to determine whether 
there is a reasonable likelihood that absent such relief a fair trial cannot 
be had. 138 Finally, denial of a request for a continuance because the 
defendant is surprised by unexpected evidence is usually error only 
when the defendant can show that the situation was unforeseen and that 
prejudice resulted. 139 
Rulings on Evidence and Witnesses 
Evidentiary rulings can be the most pivotal events in a trial. A trial 
judge enjoys considerable discretion in ruling on the admissibility of 
evidence, 140 and rulings that are not unreasonable or arbitrary withstand 
appellate attack. The familiar yardstick used by appellate courts in re-
viewing evidentiary rulings is abuse of discretion. 141 Discretion, of 
course, "does not mean immunity from accountability."142 When dis-
cretion is abused, error is committed, and if sufficiently harmful, may 
result in reversal of the conviction. 143 Although abuse of discretion with 
138 United States v. De Cruz, 82 P3d 856 (9th Cir. 1996); United States ex reI. 
Dogget v. Yeager, 472F2d 229 (3d Cir. 1973); United States v. Perez-Casillas. 593 F. 
Supp. 794 (D. PR 1984). 
139 United States v. Brand, 80 F3d 560 (1st Cir. 1996) (lasL-minute decision of co-
defendant Lo plead guilty and become government's chief witness neither unforesee-
able nor prejudicial); United States v. Dennis, 843 F2d 652 (2d Cir. 1988). 
140 Hamling v. United States, 4 18 US 87. 124-125 (1974); UniLed States v. Foun-
tain, 83 F3d 946,949 (8th Cjr. 1996) (evidentiary rulings will not be disturbed "ab-
sent a clear and prejudicial abuse of that discretion"); United Slates v. Krenzelok, 
874 F2d 480. 482 (7th Cir. 1989) ("Only in an eXLreme case are appellate judges 
competent to secondguess the judgment of the person on the spot, the trial judge."); 
United States v. MacDollald, 688 F2cl224 234 (4th Cir. 1982) (Murnaghan, J .• con-
curring) ("I would have exercised the wide discretion conferred on [the trial judge] 
to allow the testimony to come in."). The subject of judicial discretion in trial rulings 
generally is an extremely broad and c mplex topic. For ex.tensive treatment of the 
subject, see Aharon Barak, Judicial Discretion (J 987); J. Eric Smlthburn. Judicial 
Discretion (1980); Jerome Frank, Courts on Trial (1949). 
14 1 However. when legal issues predominate, appellate review of evidentiary rul-
ings is de novo. See United States v. Thompson, 37 F3d 450, 452 (9th Cir. 1994) 
(whether admis ibility of physical evidence i relevant to defense based on lack of 
knowledge Is a legal question subjecL to de novo review). 
142 United States v. Dwyer, 539 F2d 924,928 (2d Cir. 1976). 
143 See, e.g., United States v. Sorondo, 845 F2d 945 (II th Cir. 1988); United States 
v. Dotson, 799 F2d 189 (5th Cir. 1986); United States v. McBride, 786 F2d 45 (2d 
Cir. 1986); Bowden v. McKenna, 600 F2d 282 (ISl Clr. 1979). But see United States 
v. Krenzelok, 874 F2d 480 (7tb Cir. 1989) (no abu e of discretion to admit state-
ments by federal judge in unrelated case in rebutting defendant's claim that he in 
good faith believed that certain trusts were invalid); United States v. Sullivan. 803 
F2d 87 (3d Cir. 1986) (no abuse of discreLion to exclude 10 judges as character 
442 
-
JUDICIAL INTERFERENCE 
respect to evidentiary rulings is not coextensive with trial misconduct, 
erroneous evidentiary rulings, when considered together with other in-
stances of misconduct or bias, may tend to magnify errors and more 
likely result in reversal. 144 
Erroneous evidentiary rulings are usually analyzed as nonconsti-
tutional events. However, such rulings, particularly when they exclude 
critical defense evidence, may also be interpreted as constitutional er-
ror when the defense has been deprived of a fair opportunity to estab-
lish a defense in violation of due process or compulsory process. 145 If 
an appellate court frames the error in that fashion, a much more defen-
dant-friendly standard of review is used,146 and reversal consequently 
is more likely. Appellate courts appear to exercise somewhat tighter 
control when reviewing ajudge's evidentiary rulings that exclude vital 
defense evidence. 147 By contrast, rulings that admit relevant prosecu-
tion evidence, even evidence that is highly inflammatory and prejudi-
cial, are often accorded considerable appellate deference. 148 
witnesses); United Slates v. Ciampa, 793 F2d J 9 (1 st Cir. (986) (no abuse of discre-
tion to exclude evidence as being cumulative). Erroneous evidentiary rulings are 
subject to the "harmless error" rule. See United States v. Puzzo, 928 F2d 1356 (2d 
Cir. 1991) (restriction of defendant' le limony harmless error); United States v. 
Cortez, 935 F2d 135 (8th Cir. 1991) (allowing law enforcement witnesses to testify 
to truthfulness of government witness improper, but harmless). 
144 United States v. Van Dyke, 14 F3d 415 (8th Cir. 1994); United States v. Edwardo-
Franco, 885 F2d 1002 (2d Cir. 1989). 
145 State v. Carter, 636 A2d 821, 830 (Conn. 1994) (exclusion of vital defense 
evidence deprived defendant of Sixth Amendment right fairly to present to the jury 
his version of the facts). 
146 Chapman v. California, 386 US 18,24 (1967) (prosecution must demonstrate 
that error was harmless beyond reasonable doubt). 
147 United States v. Hall, 93 F3d 1337 (7th Cir. 1996); United Stales v. Thompson, 
37 F3d450 (9th Cir. 1994); United Slales v. Van Dyke. 14 F3d 415 (8th Cir. 1994); 
State v. Carter, 636 A2d 821 (Conn. 1994). A defense witness's refusal to testify 
based on a privilege raises olber significant issues. When a prosecution witness as-
serts a pri vilege on ct'Oss-examjn<ltion and thereby depri yes the defense of the ability 
to test the witness's veracity on importam substanti ve matters, the judge is obligated 
to strike the direct testimony. and the fail.ure to do so is error. United States v. Cardillo. 
316 F2d 606, 611 (2d Cir. 1963). However, there is no duty to strike testimony when 
the privilege bars cross-examination into collateral matters only. See United States 
v. Brooks, 82 F3d 50, 54-55 (2d Cir. 1996) (prosecution witness's invocation of 
privilege after direct examination did not prevent cross-examination "into the de-
tails of his direct testimony" so that "the defense is deprived of the right to test the 
truth of his direct testimony"); United States v. Berrio-Londono, 946 F2d 158 (lst 
Cir. 1991) (not error to refuse to strike direct testimony of co-conspirator who took 
Fifth Amendment in regard to prior drug deals with a co-conspirator other than de-
fendant). 
J48 United States v. Rivera, 83 F3d 542 (1st Cir. 1996) (unrelated prior rape); 
Ortiz-Sandoval v. Gomez, 81 F3d 891 (9th Cif. 1996) (threats to witnesses); United 
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The more rigorous appellate oversight that is usually associated with 
rulings that exclude relevant defense evidence is often noticeable with 
respect to rulings relating to scienLilic or other technical proof. Thus, 
excluding psychiatric testimony when the defendant's mental state is a 
crucial issue in the case can be an abuse of discretion. 149 Error may also 
be shown in rulings excluding experl testimony on the issue of the reli-
ability of eyewitness identification. 150 Exclusion of expert testimony in 
other contexts has also been held to be an abuse of discretion. 151 Discre-
tion, of course, must be applied evenhandedly. Excluding expert proof 
for the defense while allowing expert proof from the prosecution on the 
same issue ordinarily is an abuse of discretion. 152 
One of the more controversial issues involves the imposition of 
evidentiary sanctions against the defense, particularly the preclusion of 
defense proof, for violations of discovery rules. In Taylor v. Illinois,153 
States v. BUller, 7 I F3d 243 (7th Cir. 1995) (gang membership) ; People v. Wood , 
591 NE2d I 178 (NY 1992) (gruesome photos). Bul see U Itiled States v. Irvin, 87 
F3d 860 (7th Cir. 1996) (abuse of discretion to admit extensive evidence of defendant' 
membership in gang); Standen v. Whitley, 994 F2d 14 17 (9th Cir. 1993) (withdrawn 
gui lty plea improperly admitted as substantive proof of guilt); Hughes v. Common-
wealth, 43 I SE2d 906 (Va. ct. App. 1993) (forensic evidence improperly admitted 
and discretion abused when prejudice substantially outweighs probative value). 
149 United States v. McBrid ,786 F2d 45 (2d Cir. 1986); United States v. Dwyer, 
539 F2d 924 (2d Cir. 1976). But see United Stales v. Newman, 849 F2d 156 (5th Cir. 
]988) (no abuse of discretion in excluding expert testimony that certain mental de-
fects make one more susceptible to entrapment); United Stales v. Esch. 832 F2d 531 
(lOth Cif. 1987) (no abuse of discretion in excluding testimony of cl.inical psycholo-
gist that defendant did not possess the capacity to form lhe requisite mental state). 
150 United States v. Stevens, 935 F2d 1380 (3d Cir. 1991); State v. Moon. 726 P2d 
1263 (Wash. App. 1986). See United States v. S lIers. 566 F2d 884 (4th Cir. 1977). 
But see United States v. Kime, 99 F3d 870, 883-884 (81h Cil'. 19 6) (no abuse of 
discretion to exclude ex.perl witness on reliability of eyewi.tness identification); United 
States v. Blade, 811 F2d 46 L (8th Cir. 1987) (no abuse f discretion in excluding 
expert testimony on eyewitness identification WheJl government's case did not rest 
exclusively on eyewitness testimony). 
lSI See, e.g., United States v. Hall, 93 F3d 1337 (7th Cir. 1996) (abu e of ruscre-
tion to exclude expert testimony regarding defendant's susceptibility to giving false 
confe sion). This assumes that the defendant hr~. complied with discovery rules. See 
United States v. Nobles, 422 US 225 (1975) (no error in excl uding testimony of 
expert witness after defendant refused to permit discovery of relevant inve tigative 
report); UnHed States v. Cervone, 906 F2d 332. 346 (2d ir. 1990) (no error to ex-
clude testimony of expert witness for defendant's failure to comply with statutory 
notice requirements). For civil cases fiJlding an abuse of discretion in exclud ing 
experttestimony, see Garrett v. Desa indus. , Inc., 705 F2d 72 1 (4th Cir. 1983) (abuse 
of discretion to exclude mechanical engineer's testimony concerning i sue of safety 
of particular tool); Rutter v. Northeastern Beaver Cty. Sch. Disl., 437 A2d 1198 CPa. 
1981) (abuse of discretion to exclude former fo tbal! coach's testimony concerning 
issue of safety in conducting practices). 
152 United States v. Sellers. 566 F2d 884 (4th Cir. 1977). 
153 484 US 400 (l984). 
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the Supreme Court ruled that preclusion of defense testimony of an 
alibi witness as a sanction for a discovery violation did not violate the 
Sixth Amendment compulsory process clause, particularly when the 
violation appeared to be willful and the proffered evidence perjurious. 154 
Courts relying on Taylor to exclude defense evidence have emphasized 
that the discovery violation was deliberate, ISS involved dilatory tactics,156 
related to evidence of minimal probative value,157 or was prejudicial to 
the judicial process. 158 Appellate courts routinely allow the trial judge 
wide latitude in policing discovery violations, and find error only when 
discretion is abused. 159 Moreover, preclusion of defense evidence, even 
if erroneous, is reversible only when it is sufficiently prejudicial. 160 
Aside from preclusion for discovery violations, other restrictive 
rulings or conduct with respect to defense evidence can be a source of 
error. Consistent with the function as manager of the trial, a judge is 
authorized to exclude defense evidence that is irrelevant, repetitive, or 
cumulative; 161 to limit the number of defense witnesses; 162 and even to 
exclude the defendant's own testimony.163 A judge under certain cir-
cumstances may restrict defense access to prosecution witnesses. 164 
However, a judge has a duty to ensure that a defendant's right to com-
pulsory process is not impaired when an important defense witness fails 
to honor a subpoena. 165 
154 Id. at 416-417. But see Michigan v. Lucas, 500 US 145, 153 (l991)(indicating 
that Taylor authorizes preclusion even if no suggestion that proffered evidence was 
perjurious). Preclusion is most often encountered in the context of alibi witnesses. 
155 Tyson v. Trigg, 50 F3d 436 (7th Cir. 1995); Bowling v. Vose, 3 F3d 559 (lst 
Cir. 1993); Escalera v. Coombe, 852 F2d 45 (2d Cir. 1988); State v. Passino, 640 
A2d 547 (Vt. 1994); Commonwealth v. Zimmerman, 571 A2d 1062 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
1990). 
156 Tyson, 50 F3d 436 (7th Cir. 1995); State v. Killean, 915 P2d 1225 (Ariz. 1996); 
Zimmerman, 571 A2d at 1062. 
157 People of Territory of Guam v. Palomo, 35 F3d 368 (9th Cir. 1994); United 
States v. Duggan, 743 F2d 59 (2d Cir. 1984). 
158 United States v. Johnson, 970 F2d 907 (DC Cir. 1992). 
159 United States v. Davis, 40 F3d 1069 (10th Cir. 1994); Sandoval v. Acevedo, 
996 F2d 145 (7th Cir. 1993); Fendler v. Goldsmith, 728 F2d 1181 (9th Cir. 1983); 
People v. Gonzales, 28 Cal. Rptr. 325 (1994). 
160 Tyson, 50 F3d at 436. 
161 Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 US 673, 679 (1986). 
162 United States v. Holmes, 44 F3d 1150 (2d Cir. 1994). 
163 United States v. Stewart, 20 F3d 911 (8th Cir. 1994). 
164 United States v. Medina, 992 F2d 573 (6th Cir. 1993). 
165 United States v. Simpson, 992 F2d 1224 (DC Cir. 1993). 
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Trial judges also enjoy extremely broad discretion with respect to 
real and demonstrative evidence. Rulings of admissibility are ordinarily 
upheld if the evidence is relevant and properly authenticated. Special 
problems can arise with respect to some types of real evidence. For 
example, sound recordings c ntaining inaudible portions are admis-
sible unless the incomprehen ible portions are 0 significant as to ren-
der the rec riling as a whole unrcliable. 166 Transcript are admitted if 
reasonably accurate, and courts have devised procedures t minimize dis-
tortion and assist the jury's comprehension. 167 Courtroom demonstrations 
purporting to reenact events at trial ,u'e permitted as long as the demonstra-
tion fairly depicts the events at issue. 168 Charts. summaries, and transparen-
cies are cautiollsly allowed. as long as th evidence assist the jury and the 
judge imposes safeguards to minimize possible prejudice. 169 
A judge ordinarily shouJd make specific findings of the basis for an 
evidentiary mling. 170 Failure to state the rea ons for an evidentiary ruling 
can be a factor in finding an abu. e of iscretion.171 The "Law of the case" 
doctrine ordinarily is not applicable to evidentiary rulings made during 
prior proceedjngs~ coordinate courts, therefore, are not bound by such rul-
ings but may. in the exercise of discretion, reconsider sllch rulings.172 
Rulings That Undermine the Presumption of Innocence 
A fair trial before a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due pro-
cess.173 A fundamental component of this due process guarantee is the 
166 United States v. Webster, 84 F3d 1056, 1064 (8th Cir. 1996); United States v. 
Howard, 80 F3d 1194, 1198-1199 (7th Cir. 1996). 
167 Howard, 80 F3d at 1199 Uudge should conduct hearing to assess accuracy of 
government's transcript; if stipulated or official transcript cannot be produced, then 
each side may produce its own version, and may introduce evidence supporting its 
version). 
168 United States v. Birch, 39 F3d 1089 (10th Cir. 1994) (demonstration reenact-
ing defendant's version of shooting). 
169 United States v. Johnson, 54 F3d 1150, 1162 (4th Cir. 1995) (organizational 
chart summarizing complex drug conspiracy allowed with caveat that such evidence 
would not be admissible in "ordinary federal drug prosecution"); United States v. 
Crockett, 49 F3d 1357, 1362 (8Lh Cir. 1995) (pro ecutor's use of overhead transpar-
encies to characterize evidence aUowed; although judges "have virtually unfettered 
discretion to regulate the use of such non-evidentiary devices . . .. prosecutionruns a 
tangible risk of creating reversible erIOr when it seeks to augment the impact of its 
oral argument with pedagogic devices"). 
170 United States v. Nagib, 56 F3d 798 (7th Cir. 1995). 
171 United States v. Dwyer, 539 F2d 924 (2d Cir. 1976). 
172 United States v. Todd, 920 F2d 399, 402 (6th Cir. 1990). 
173 Drope v. Missouri, 420 US 162, 172 (1975); In re Murchison, 349 US 133, 136 
(1955); In re Oliver, 333 US 257 (1948); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 US 510 (1927). 
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presumption of innocence. 174 Conduct and rulings by the trial judge can 
violate due process by depriving an accused of the presumption of in-
nocence. Thus, permitting a trial to take place in an atmosphere in-
flamed by public passion and a biased jury violates due process,175 as 
does allowing a trial to be conducted in a "carnival atmosphere" of 
media excess to the point where "bedlam reigned." 176 More subtle, but 
equally harmful impediments to a fair trial, include allowing spectators to 
engage in demonstrations against the defendant, 177 carry identifiable signs 
prejudicial to a defendant (such as wearing buttons inscribed with the words 
"Women Against Rape" during a defendant's trial for sex offenses),178 or 
insinuate to the jury that the defendant has AIDS by offering to provide 
them with gloves if they wished to handle any exhibits. 179 
Logistical decisions by the judge can impair the presumption of 
innocence. Placing ajury in the custody of deputy sheriffs who are also 
prosecution witnesses potentially erodes the presumption of inno-
cence. 180 So do seating arrangements that allow the victim to sit at counsel 
table with the prosecuting attorney during the trial. 181 Actual prejudice 
174 The presumption of innocence is a basic component of a fair trial. As the Su-
preme Court observed in Coffin v. United States, 156 US 432, 453 (1895): 
The principle that there is a presumption of innocence in favor of the accused is 
the undoubted law, axiomatic and elementary, and its enforcement lies at the foun-
dation of the administration of our criminal law. 
175 Irvin v. Dowd, 366 US 717 (1961); Stroble v. California, 343 US 181 (1952); 
Moore v. Dempsey, 261 US 86 (1923). 
176 Sheppard v. Maxwell , 384 US 333 (1966). See also Estes v. Texas, 381 US 532 
(1965) . 
177 Cox v. Louisiana, 379 US 559, 562 (1965). 
178 Norris v. Risley, 918 F2d 828 (9th Cir. 1990). See People v. Pennisi, 563 NYS2d 
612 (NY Sup. Ct. 1990) (judge refuses to allow courtroom spectators to wear obtrusive 
corsages of red and black ribbons to show sympathy for victims in homicide prosecu-
tion). The situation probably is different where no jury is present. See Matter of Frankel 
v. Roberts, 567 NYS2d 1018 (NY App. Div. 1991) (improper restriction on free speech 
to order attorney to remove from lapel political button during nonjury proceedings). 
179 Commonwealth v. Martin, 660 NE2d 670 (Mass. App. Ct. 1996), rev'd, 676 
NE2d 451 (Mass. 1997). See also Wiggins v. State, 554 A2d 356 (Md. 1989) (judge 
committed reversible error in permitting guards to wear rubber gloves during trial of 
defendant suspected of having AIDS). But see People v. Bonaventura, 563 NYS2d 
465 (NY App. Div. 1990) (allowing court officers to wear surgical gloves while 
handling evidentiary articles of defendant 's clothing did not stigmatize defendant as 
being diseased). 
180 Turner v. Louisiana, 379 US 466 (1965). 
lSI Mask v. State, 869 SW2d 1,4 (Ark. 1994) ("manipulation of seating arrange-
ment ... tantamount to the Trial Court expressing an opinion on the credibility of 
witnesses"). But see Crowe v. State, 485 So. 2d 351 (Ala. Crim. App. 1984) (statute 
allows crime victim to sit at counsel table). 
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in such cases may not need to be shown because the conduct is inher-
ently prejudicial; it presents "an unacceptable risk of impermissible 
factors coming into play."182 
Other types of logistical arrangements usually withstand attack. For 
example, judges have broad discretion to take measures to ensure the 
safety and order of the proceedings. Thus, allowing uniformed and armed 
police officials to sit directly behind a defendant was not error. 183 Nor 
was it error to allow police officers to escort a defendant, a convicted mur-
derer, to the witness stand, remain next to him while he testified, and escort 
him back to his chair. 184 These measures have heen held not "inherently 
prejudicial," and do not pose an "unacceptable risk of prejudice."185 
By contrast, compelling a defendant to wear identifiable prison at-
tire is inherently prejudicial, and may be violative of a fair trial by im-
pairing the presumption of innocence. 186 Such a requirement plainly 
"furthers no essential state policy," and violates the concept of equal 
justice because it usually operates against indigents who cannot post 
bail. 187 However, because the particular evil is compulsion, a defendant 
must object to having to wear prison clothes at trial. 188 Moreover, even 
182 Estelle v. Williams, 425 US 501, 505 (1976). 
183 Id. at 572. 
184 Wainwright v. Lockhart, 80 F3d 1226, 1232 (8th Cir. 1996) ("jury would view 
the officers' presence and actions as ordinary and normal concern for the safety and 
order of the pIoceeclings"). See also United States v. Darden, 70 F3d 1507 (8th Cir. 
1995) (in trial of violent criminal enterprise, it was not error to use metal detectors 
outside courtroom, sequestration, transportation by marshals, armed guards along 
street, helicopters, and snipers on courthouse roof); Hopkinson v. Shillinger, 866 
F2d 1185 (10th Cir. 1989) (not error when guards used magnetometer to check ev-
eryone entering courtroom, PIO ecutor's bodyguards wore bulletproof vests and vis-
ibly carried guns, and guards audibly cocked guns when lights went out in courtroom); 
State v. Aguilar, 352 NW2d 395, 396- 397 (Minn. 1984) (no prejudice from use of 
metal detector). 
185 Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 US 560,571 (1986). 
186 Estelle, 425 US at 504. See also ABA Standards for Criminal Justice 15-3.1(c) 
(2d ed. 1986). 
187 Estelle, 425 US at 505-506. 
188 Id. at 509-510 (no compulsion when, possibly for tactical reasons, neither 
defendant nor his counsel objected either before or at any time during trial). An 
objection must be timely. See United States v. Hurtado, 47 F3d 577, 581 (2d Cif. 
1995) (objection made on first day of trial timely because counsel objected as soon 
as he became aware of client's appearance); United States v. Harris, 703 F2d 508. 
511 (lith Cir. 1983) (same). But see United States v. Martin, 964 F2d 714, 719 (7th 
Cir. 1992) (defendant should have objected before any trial proceedings had com-
menced and not waited until the middle of the first day of trial after entire jury 
empaneled). 
448 
JUDICIAL INTERFERENCE 
when the defendant is compelled to wear prison clothes, the constitu-
tional error is subject to harmless error analysis. 189 
Ordering a defendant to be shackled, or even gagged, presents more 
difficult problems. Clearly, the sight of a defendant bound and gagged 
could have a profound impact on ajury's feelings about that defendant. 
Shackles alone are inherently prejudicial because they are an "unmis-
takable indication of the need to separate a defendant from the commu-
nity at large."190 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court in Illinois v. Allen191 
upheld the practice of binding and gagging a defendant when necessary 
to control disruptive and contumacious conduct. Because "dignity, or-
der, and decorum be the hallmarks of all court proceedings in our coun-
try,"192 the Court allowed trial judges wide discretion to control unruly 
defendants, including exclusion from the courtroom, citing for contempt, 
or shackling and gagging. 
Due process requires that shackles be used only as a "last resort." 193 
A judge acts within his or her discretion when he or she has a rational 
and justifiable basis for such restraint. 194 The court's decision is error 
only when the discretion is abused. 195 Shackling is appropriate when 
the defendant presents a clear risk of escape, 196 or there is a threat to the 
189 United States v. Hurtado, 47 F3d 577, 581 (2d Cir. 1995) (harmless error when 
defendant appeared in prison attire for only one day; evidence of guilt overwhelm-
ing; and district court offered to give curative instruction, which defendant rejected). 
See also Duckett v. Godinez, 67 F3d 734, 747 (9th Cir. 1995) ("prison clothing can-
not be considered inherently prejudicial when the jury already knows, based upon 
other facts, that the defendant has been deprived of his liberty"). 
190 Holbrook, 475 US at 568-569. 
191 Illinois v. Allen, 397 US 337 (1970). 
192 Id. at 343. A judge has an obligation to maintain courtroom decorum in other 
ways. For example, failing to take action when a witness on the stand ingested drugs 
in open view of some jurors constituted "a serious abdication of [the judge's] re-
sponsibility to maintain order and to control the proceedings." United States v. Van 
Meerbeke, 548 F2d 415 (2d Cir. 1976). 
193 Allen, 397 US at 344. Some appellate courts require that the trial judge pursue 
less restrictive alternatives before imposing physical restraints. See Castillo v. Stainer, 
983 F2d 145, 147-148 (9th Cir. 1992). 
194 Hellum v. Warden, 28 F3d 903 (8th Cir. 1994); Morgan v. Bunnell, 24 F3d 49 
(9th Cir. 1994); Brewster v. Bordenkircher, 745 F2d 913,915 (4th Cir. 1984); People 
v. Rouse, 591 NE2d 1172 (NY 1992); People v. Bosket, 564 NYS2d 785 (NY App. 
Div. 1990). A trial judge need not conduct an evidentiary hearing or make formal 
findings before ordering that a defendant be shackled. See Morgan v. Bunnell, 24 
F3d 49,52 (9th Cir. 1994); United States v. Stewart, 20 F3d 911, 915 n.8 (8th Cir. 
1994). However, the basis for the decision to shackle should be apparent from the 
record. Duckett v. Godinez, 67 F3d 734, 749 (9th Cir. 1995); Helium v. Warden, 28 
F3d 903,907 (8th Cir. 1994). 
195 Helium, 28 F3d at 907. 
196 Id. at 907; Morgan, 24 F3d at 49; United States v. Weeks, 919 F2d 248 (5th Cir. 
1990); People v. Greiner, 549 NYS2d 831 (NY App. Div. 1989). 
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safety and security of court personnel or spectators. 197 Shackling a de-
fendant who is representing himself or herself poses special problems 
about which the judge must inform the defendant. 198 Shackling a co-
defendant,199 or a defense witness,2oo is also within the judge's discre-
tion. Courts make a distinction between a defendant's exposure to the 
jury inside the courtroom under unusual conditions of restraint, and an 
inadvertent exposure while under routine security restraints outside the 
courtroom.20l When shackling is used, judges should try to minimize 
the potential for prejudice by employing restraints, that is, leg braces, 
that can be hidden from the jury's view.202 
Gagging is allowed when the defendant poses a clear risk of dis-
rupting the trial by making statements thal might impair the orderly 
trial process. An order gagging a defendant was upheld after the defen-
dant violated the judge's warning by blurting out that he had not been per-
mitted to take a lie detector test, and that the government's main witness 
was a convicted car thief.2°3 When shackling or gagging is used, a curative 
instruction sh uld be given that the l'I~straint has no bearing on the defendant's 
guilt. 204 owever, when the defense fails to request an instruction, the judge 
is under no obligation to give one sua sponte.205 
Coercing Witnesses 
A judge may not coerce a witnes either to give testimony, or to 
refrain from giving testimony. Due proces guarantees a criminal de-
fendant the right to offer the testimony of witnes es to establish his 
defense.206 A judge's conduct in pre,suring defense witnesses not to 
197 Helium, 28 F3d at 903; Morgan, 24 F3d at 49; Stewart v. Corbin, 850 F2d 492 
(9th Cir. 1988); Bosket, 564 NYS2d at 785. 
lUX Abdullah v. Groose, 44 F3d 692, 695 (8th Cir. 1995) ("once the court decided 
to shackle him, tbe court made no effort to ascertain whether [defendant] understood 
the effect shackling would have on his ability to represent himself'). 
1~9 State v. Brewer, 301 So. 2d 630 (La. 1974). 
200 People v. Bryant, 551 NYS2d 612 (NY App. Div. 1990). 
201 United States v. Moreno, 933 F2d 362 (6th Cir. 1991). 
202 Helium, 28 F3d at 903; Weeks, 919 F2d at 248. Other ways to minimize preju-
dice include excusing the jury when the defendant walked to the witness stand. See 
Morgan, 24 F3d at 52. 
203 Stewart v. Corbin, 850 F2d 492, 495-496 (9th Cir. 1988). 
204 Moreno, 933 F2d at 362; Stewart, 850 F2d at 492, 495-496; People v. Hart, 
491 NYS2d 74 (NY App. Div. 1985). 
205 Rouse, 591 NE2d at 1172. 
206 Washington v. Texas, 388 US 14, 19 (1967). 
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testify by admonishing them about the consequences of giving false 
testimony can violate due process. Thus, in Webb v. Texas,207 the judge 
gratuitously singled out the defendant's only witness with a lengthy 
admonition on the dangers of perjury, and threatened him with severe 
consequences if he lied, following which the witness refused to testify 
and was excused.208 The Supreme Court reversed the conviction on due 
process grounds. The Court found that the judge's strong-arm tactics 
"could well have exerted such duress on the witness's mind as to pre-
clude him from making a free and voluntary choice whether or not to 
testify."209 The Court concluded that "the judge's threatening remarks, 
directed only at a single witness for the defense, effectively drove that 
witness off the stand."210 
However, judges have discretion to warn witnesses about the possi-
bility of incriminating themsel ves by giving perj ured testimony. 211 Thus, 
discussing the consequences of giving perjured testimony with a po-
tential defense witness is not necessarily improper, particularly when 
the judge has a legitimate basis for believing that the witness might 
207 Webb v. Texas, 409 US 95 (1972). 
208 The judge admonished the witness as follows: 
Now you have been called down a Q witness in this case by the Defendant. It 
is the Court 's duty to admonish you that you don'r have to te ·tify, that anything 
you say can be used against you. If you toke the witness stand and lie under oath, 
the Court will personally see that y ur case goe L the grand jury and you will be 
indicted for perjury and the liklibood (sic) is that you would get convicted of 
perjury and lhat it would be stacked onto what you have already gol., so that is the 
matter you have gotto make up your mind on. U you gelon the witness stand and 
lie, it is probably going to mean several years and at least more time that you are 
going to have to serve. It will also be held again ·t you in the penitentiary when 
you're up for parole and the Coun wants you to Lhoroughly untlerstand Lbe chances 
you re taking by getting on lhat witness stand under oath. You may teU the truth 
and if you do, that is aU right, but if you lie you can get into real trouble. The court 
wants you to know that. You don't owe anybody anything to testify and it must be 
done freely and voluntarily and with the thorough understanding that you know 
the hazard you are taking. 
Id. at 95-96. 
209 Id. at 98. 
l lo ld. See aJso Anderson v. W~u'den, Md. Penitentiary, 696 F2d 296 (4th Cir. 1982) 
Gudge "openly and successfully pressed defelld~tnt's two key witnesses to change 
their testimony"); Berg v. Morris, 483 F. Supp. 179 (ED Cal. L980) Gudge clearly 
indicated disbelief in witness's testjmony and Ulreatened witness with perjury and 
parole revocation) . Although the Court in Webb rever 'ed the conviction without dis-
cussing the prejudjcial effect of the loss of the defense witness, subsequent ea es 
clearly h ld that harmless error analysi is required for Webh violations. 
211 United States v. Smith, 997 F2d 674, 680 (10th Cir. \993); United States v. 
Arthur, 949 F2d 211, 215 (6th Cif. 199]). 
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commit perj ury. 212 Of course, distinguishing proper concern from improper 
intimidation is not easy. Even the conscientious judge must be careful lest 
his or her comments become so inlimidaling that they create a real possi-
bility that the witness's decisjon not to testify was based on the judge's 
coercive language rather than on the witness's own voluntary choice.213 
Nor may ajudge coerce a witne s into giving testimony. Occasional 
admonishments to a reluctant witness are proper.214 
Moreover, ajudge is empowered to order testimony from a witness 
who has been granted immunity.215 However, a judge may not use the 
contempt power, or his or her sentencing authority as pretexts to co-
erce witnesses into giving favorable testimony for the government.216 
Similarly, a judge comments to a defendant tbat her only chance of ac-
quittal is to take the stand and te tify 'went too far," and in any event 
should have been directed to defense counsel.217 Nevertheless, a reviewing 
court will examine the record to determine whether such coercive remarks 
deprived the witness of the free will to make a voluntary decision.218 
Failing to Sequester Witnesses 
The sequestering of witnesses has existed since Biblical times219 
and serves two purposes: it "exercises a restraint on witnesses' 'tailor-
21 2 United States v. Simmons, 670 2d 365, 368- 369 (DC Cir. 1982) ("Webb thus 
holds that a defendant is denied due process of law when a trial judge, without any 
basis in the record to conclude that u witness might lie. sua sp nte admonishes the 
defendant's only wjt:ne S • . . and lhereby discourages the witness from testifying"); 
Reese v. United States, 467 A2d 152 (DC App. 1983) Gudge s perjury remarks based 
on witness's plan to recant grand jury testimony that defendant confessed to the 
crime). 
213 Yates v. United States, 513 A2d 818 (DC App. 1986) (conviction affinned in a 
"close case" despite judge's unnecessarily repetitive and emphatic remarks that caused 
witness to change his testimony). 
214 Gaston v. Hunter, Ariz. 588 P2d 326 (1978). 
215 Kastigar v. United States, 406 US 441. 448-459 (1972). 
216 United Stales v. Giraldo. 822 F2d 205 (2c1 Cir. 1987) Gudge's threatening wit-
ness with civil contempt and severe entencc "subvert[ed] botb the proper purposes 
of sentencing for criminal offenses and the temporal limitations on civil contempt 
sanctions"; nevertheless, no prejudice to defendant was proved). 
217 United States v. Goodwin, 770 F2d 631 (7th Cir. 1985) (although judge's re-
marks "came very close to resulting in improper coercion," defendant's decision to 
testify apparently voluntary and any error harmless). 
2IK rd . Sec United States v. Hoffman. 832 F2d 1299. I 03 (1st Cir. 1987) (requir-
ing 'some l)luusible nexus" between the challenged conduct and the witness's deci-
si n); United States v. Crawford, 707 F2d 447.449 CLOth ir. 1983) (test is whether 
conduct sub ·tantially interfered with witness's decision). 
219 Government of Virgin Is. v. Edinborough, 625 F2d 472, 473 n.3 (3d Cir. 1980). 
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ing' their testimony to that of earlier witnesses, and it aids in detecbng 
testimony that is less than candid."220 Modern statutes make sequestra-
tion a matter of right rather than a matter commilted to the trial judge's 
discretion.221 Although statutes typically limit coverage to the physical 
boundaries of the courtroom, in effect affording parties only the right to 
close the courtroom to prospective witnesses,222 judges retain consider-
able discretion to enter much broader orders that may include seques-
tration of witnesses before, during, and after their testimony,223 entering 
nondiscussion orders,224 and compelling parties to present witnesses in 
a prescribed sequence.225 
Sequestration rules also provide for exemptions, and a judge has 
discretion to determine whether a witness or witnesses may be exempted 
from the rule.226 Such exemptions frequently involve government agents 
who have assisted the prosecution in developing the case. 227 Among the 
factors relevant to the exercise of discretion are the importance of the 
220 United States v. Geders, 425 US 80, 87 (1976) . 
22 1 United States v. Jackson, 60 F3d 128, 134-135 (2d Cir. 1995) ("strong pre-
sumption in favor of sequestration"). See also State v. Omechinski, 468 SE2d 173, 
177 (W. Va. 1996) (rule also applies to rebuttal witnesses) . The mandatory language 
of modern sequestration statutes is illustrated by Rule 615 of the Federal Rules of 
Evidence, which states: 
At the request of a party the court shall order witnesses excluded so that they 
cannot hear the testimony of other witnesses, and it may make the order on its 
own motion. This rule does not authorize exclusion of (I) a party who is a natural 
person, or (2) an officer or employee of a party which is not a natural person 
designated as its representative by its attorney, or (3) a person whose presence is 
shown by a party to be essential to the presentation of the party's cause. 
Many states continue to leave sequestration to the trial judge's discretion. See, 
e.g., RIR Evid. 615 . 
222 But see United States v. Greschner, 802 F2d 373, 376 (10th Cir. 1986) (circum-
vention of rule occurs when parties indirectly defeat its purpose by discussing their 
testimony with other witnesses who are to testify) . 
mUnitedStatesv.Sepulveda,15F3d 1161, 1176 (lstCir. 1993). 
224 Id. at 1176 ("non-discussion orders are generally thought to be a standard 
concomitant of basic sequestration fare"); United States v. Greschner, 802 F2d 373, 
376 (10th Cir. 1986) (nondiscussion component implicit in rule); State v. Omechinski, 
468 SE2d at 178 ("in addition to instructing the witnesses to leave the courtroom, 
the judge should instruct them not to discuss the case"). 
225 Sepulveda, 15 F3d at 1176. 
226 Compare Jackson, 60 F3d at 128, 134-135 (allowing three case agents to re-
main in the courtroom at prosecutor's table may be permissible) with United States 
v. Ramirez, 963 F2d 693 (5th Cir. 1992) (assumption that judge abused discretion in 
allowing more than one case agent to remain in courtroom). 
227 Jackson, 60 F3d at 128, 134-135 (exempting three case agents not necessarily 
abuse of discretion); Ramirez, 963 F2d at 693 (allowing two case agents to remain in 
courtroom assumed to constitute abuse of discretion) . 
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testimony; whether it will involve controverted facts; whether the in-
formation is ordinarily subject to tailoring such that cross-examination 
could expose deficiencies; the extent that the testimony will encom-
pass the same issues as that of other witnesses; the order in which the 
witnesses will testify; any potential bias that might motivate the witness's 
testimony; and whether the witness's presence is essential or merely 
desirable.228 Errors typically associated with sequestration include a 
judge's failure to give witnesses appropriate nondiscussion instruc-
tions,229 exclusion of evidence that a witness violated the sequestration 
order,230 and ajudge's failure to order witnesses to leave the courtroom. 23 I 
A court may impose various sanctions for a violation of sequestra-
tion, including holding the offending party in contempt, permitting cross-
examination concerning the violation, and precluding the witness from 
testifying.232 Disqualifying a witness from testifying should not be lightly 
imposed, and it is usually an abuse of discretion to preclude testimony 
unless the defendant or the defendant's counsel has cooperated in the 
violation. 233 Declaring a mistrial is also within a court's discretion.234 
Any error in administering sequestration is subject to a showing of 
prejudice.235 Courts differ as to which party has the burden on the issue 
of prejudice. Several courts require the party aggrieved by the seques-
tration error to demonstrate prejudice.236 Other courts place the burden 
on the prosecution to prove that the error was harmless on the theory 
228 Jackson, 60 F3d at 135. 
229 United States v. Greschner, 802 F2d 373 (lOth Cir. 1986); Omechinski, 468 
SE2d at 173. 
230 Childress v. State, 467 SE2d 865 (Ga. 1996) (reversible error after one witness 
attempted to influence testimony of another witness who had not yet testified). 
231 Solomon v. State, 913 SW2d 288 (Ark. 1996) Uudge commits reversible error 
in allowing prosecution witnesses to remain in courtroom). 
232 United States v. Hobbs, 31 F3d 918, 921 (9th Cir. 1994); United States v. 
Eyster, 948 F2d 1196, 1211 (llth Cir. 1991). 
233 Hobbs, 31 F3d at 921; Braswell v. Wainwright, 463 F2d 1148, 1157 (5th Cir. 
1972). 
234 United States v. Klinginsmith, 25 F3d 1507, 1511 (lOth Cir. 1994) (mistrial 
considered a "rather drastic remedy"). See also United States v. Womack, 654 F2d 
1034, 1040 (5th Cir. 1981). 
235 Jackson, 60 F3d at 136 (citing cases from other circuits). 
236 United States v. Sykes, 977 F2d 1242, 1245 (8th Cir. 1992); United States v. 
Ramirez, 963 F2d 693, 704 (5th Cir. 1992); Government of Virgin Is. v. Edinborough, 
625 F2d 472, 474 (3d Cir. 1980); Solomon v. State, 913 SW2d at 290-291. 
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that it probably is impossible to tell how a witness's testimony would 
have differed had there been compliance with the rule. 237 
"Sandbagging" Counsel 
A judge frequently makes trial rulings on which defense counsel 
relies. For example, a judge might represent to counsel that he or she 
will instruct the jury on a particular legal theory, or allow a party to 
introduce evidence or examine a witness at a future point in the trial, or, 
in a bench trial, make a credibility determination concerning a witness. 
Counsel in such a case should be able to rely on the judge's representa-
tions, and might reasonably formulate subsequent trial strategy based 
on those assurances. 238 However, if the judge later reverses his or her 
position, and takes no steps to avoid prejudice, he or she can deprive a 
party of a fair trial. 
That precise situation occurred in United States v. MendeP39 when, 
during a bench conference, the judge stated to defense counsel that he 
did not find a government witness's testimony reliable. However, fol-
lowing summations, the judge changed his position and indicated that 
the witness was indeed credible in certain respects. Defense counsel 
had relied on the judge's earlier credibility announcement by forgoing 
submission of evidence that would have impeached the witness. A 
motion for a mistrial was denied, but the Second Circuit reversed the 
conviction, observing, "It cannot be said that a criminal trial was fair 
when the judge in mid-trial announced that certain testimony will not 
be credited and then without warning based a conviction in major part 
on that very testimony."240 
237 Jackson, 60 F3d at 128; United States v. Pulley, 922 F2d 1283, 1286 (6th Cir. 
1991); United States v. Farnham, 791 F2d 331, 335 (4th Cir. 1986); Omechinski, 468 
SE2d at 180-181. 
238 Rule 30 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure requires the district judge 
to inform counsel of which instruction are going to be given in order to allow coun-
sel to argue the case intelligently to the jury. A violation of this rule is reversible 
conduct if it prejudices the defendant. See United States v. Gaskins, 849 F2d 454 
(9th Cir. 1988) (giving supplemental instruction concerning aiding and abetting in 
response to jury note, after advising counsel that it would not do so, reversible con-
duct). 
239 United States v. Mendel, 746 F2d 155 (2d Cir. 1984). 
24oId. at 163. See also United States v. Ienco, 92 F3d 564 (7th eir. 1960) (prejudi-
cial errorfor judge to announce during prosecution's case in chief that il would not 
give a Pinkerton .instruction. and then after both sides completed examining wit-
nesses changed his mind and said he would give such an instruction). 
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In a similar situation ajudge advised defense counsel that his cross-
examination of government witnesses regarding bias and illicit motive 
in their preparation of tape recordings and transcripts would have to 
await the defense case. 241 When the defense commenced its case, the 
judge again denied counsel the opportunity to question these witnesses 
because "he could well have done that on his earlier cross-examination 
of the agents." The Second Circuit reversed the conviction, finding that 
the trialjudge's about-face in effect "sandbagged" defense counsel into 
forgoing defense option. A similar about-face resulted in reversible 
error when the judge, after assuring defense counsel that he would in-
struct the jury on a particular legal theory, and after counsel gave a 
closing argument premised on that assurance, reversed himself and re-
fused to give that instruction.242 
Conclusion 
A linchpin of the criminal justice system is the ability of defense 
counsel to represent a client effectively. The trial judge's conduct can 
hamper defense counsel's performance either by remarks that denigrate 
or threaten counsel, rulings that undermine effective representation, or 
other conduct that communicates to the jury the judge'S disposition ei-
ther to favor the prosecution or to disfavor the defense. The judge's 
behavior, in the various contexts described earlier, has the potential to 
seriously impair defense counsel's ability to represent the client effec-
tively, and thereby prejudice the defendant's right to a fair trial. 
241 United States v. Salerno, 937 F2d 797 (2d Cir. 1991). 
2<12 People v. Greene, 553 NE2d 1014 (NY 1990). See also United States v. Gaskins, 
849 F2d 454 (9th Cir. 1988) (improper to give supplemental instruction concerning 
particular lega] theory after assuring defense counsel that it would not do so). 
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